ABSTRACT This paper finds that one can econometrically ascertain the determinants of default to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) through panel logit analysis. Creditworthiness is found to be determined by political and external factors in addition to economic variables. Default to the IBRD is seen to fall into a graduated hierarchy of default, whereby default occurs first to Paris Club and Commercial Bank creditors, with subsequent default to the IBRD being triggered by a high proportion of IBRD and short-term debt in the portfolio and other economic and political factors.
Introduction
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) is the part of the World Bank Group which makes loans to middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries, typically for longer terms and at lower interest rates than these countries could obtain from commercial sources. Default to the IBRD is a rare phenomenon that is seen by many to arise purely from idiosyncratic, mainly political, shocks; in contrast to defaults to bilateral and private creditors, where economic events are deemed to play a greater role. In this study we carry out a thorough investigation of this premise, using panel logit econometric models to investigate the determinants of IBRD default. We also model default to Paris Club creditors and to Commercial Banks in order to determine the degree of commonality in the determinants of default across creditor groups, and to investigate the plausibility of a graduated hierarchy of default, whereby default to the IBRD occurs only after default to other creditors.
Correspondence address: David McKenzie, Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, USA. Email: mcken@stanford.edu Empirical models have been used for country risk analysis since the mid-1970s, with probit and logit models emerging as the preferred estimation technique. However, attention has tended to remain focused on default to a broad group of creditors (see for example Cline, 1984; Ul Haque et al., 1996; Lee, 1991; Lanoie & Lemarbre, 1996) , with separate analysis of debt repayment to international organizations seemingly neglected. Bird & Rowlands (2001) and Barro & Lee (2002) examine the determinants of the granting of IMF lending agreements, and their consequences for growth, but do not consider default. They emphasize the importance of political as well as economic factors in determining whether IMF loans are made. Aylward & Thorne (1998) address repayment performance to the International Monetary Fund and find that indicators of credit history with the Fund, together with a small number of macroeconomic variables yield a significant model of the probability of a country incurring arrears to the Fund. We carry out a similar exercise for arrears to the IBRD. However, our methodology is somewhat different with a more in-depth analysis of issues of state dependence and the use of random effects models where appropriate. We also consider many more determinants of default in our analysis, in particular providing a more detailed modelling of the importance of political and external factors.
1 Our work additionally contributes to the existing literature through its explicit consideration of a default hierarchy whereby default occurs first to Paris Club and Commercial Bank creditors, with subsequent default to the IBRD being triggered by a high proportion of IBRD and short-term debt in the portfolio and other economic and political factors.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section defines the measures of default and the section after describes the variables used as determinants of default. The fourth section outlines the econometric methodology used in this paper and the subsequent section reports the results of econometric analysis of default to the IBRD, Paris Club Creditors and Commercial Banks. In this section we also model IBRD default as a two-step process, whereby debtors default to the IBRD only after default to less-preferred creditors. The final section concludes.
Definition of Default to the IBRD and Other Lenders
Our study is over the period 1980-98 for 58 developing countries that were IBRD borrowers. Appendix Table A1 lists the countries included. The countries selected are all of the IBRD borrowers for which data were available; IBRD borrowers from the former Soviet republics, part of former 1 Aylward & Thorne use two year-dependent dummy variables to account for external events. In their statistical appendix there is some consideration of the role of political factors, but they do not develop a link between political factors and Fund arrears in their econometric models.
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Yugoslavia, and small island states such as the Seychelles and Fiji did not have sufficient data. The dependent variable in our analysis, denoted Y it , is a binary indicator of whether or not a specific country i was in default to the IBRD in a specific year t, where default occurs when a country enters non-accrual status with the IBRD. Non-accrual status occurs when a country is 180 days or more late in its IBRD debt repayment.
Rescheduling of intergovernmental loans and officially guaranteed private export credits takes place under the aegis of the Paris Club. To make the debt relief effective, debtor countries must sign bilateral agreements with each creditor. One might expect, a priori, that such agreements may be an indicator of possible default to the IBRD in the future, both because they represent a worsening debt-servicing ability, and also because the act of defaulting to Paris Club creditors may reduce the supply of credit available, and hence further exacerbate repayment problems. On the other hand, an IMF programme must be in place for a Paris Club meeting to occur, a condition of which is no arrears to multilaterals. If the Fund programme is successful in improving economic conditions, this may then reduce the likelihood of default. Hence, prior rescheduling of official debt may have opposing effects on the probability of IBRD default.
Concluding and signing bilateral agreements can take one year or more, so than when an agreement occurs, we attempt to resolve the lag between the request for a rescheduling and the eventual signing of such an agreement by appropriate adjustment of the starting date. We define 'default' to Paris Club creditors or to Commercial Banks as a situation whereby a country is unable to meet the current terms of its debt servicing, and hence requires a rescheduling agreement. The general principle for determining the emergence of 'default' was to use the contract cut-off date for multilateral debt agreements with official creditors, and the start date of the consolidation period for rescheduling agreements with commercial banks, adjusting these dates as necessary. A country is then said to remain in 'default' status until it is able to meet payments on the rescheduled terms without requiring a subsequent rescheduling at the end of the period covered by the current agreement. The exit date for 'default' is thus taken as the end date of the period covered by an agreement, provided that it is followed by an immediate period of no rescheduling. Appendix Table A1 lists the default entry and exit dates for each country. Figure 1 compares the number of countries in default status to the IBRD with the number of countries in default to the Paris Club and to Commercial Banks over the period 1981-98. The first default to the IBRD occurred in 1985, with the late 1980s bringing an increase in subsequent defaults. Defaults to Commercial Banks and to the Paris Club occurred earlier, with the debt crisis of 1982-83. We see that defaults to Commercial Banks appear to precede defaults to the Paris Club by roughly two years, with the number of countries defaulting to either institution following the same pattern: rising during the 1980s, and declining during the 1990s. The more serious implications of default to the IBRD are reflected in the relatively small number of countries in non-accrual status to the IBRD as compared to the other creditors. Only 12 out of our 58 countries defaulted to the IBRD over the sample period, while 37 defaulted to Commercial Banks and 42 to the Paris Club. This illustrates that default to the IBRD is a rare phenomenon, and we rely on variation in default status both over time and across countries in order to identify determinants of default.
Determinants of Default
Ul Haque et al. (1996) describe two broad theoretical approaches to sovereign default risk. Under the 'debt-service capacity' approach, default arises from an unintended deterioration of the borrower's capacity to service its debt, and is thus determined by economic variables. The 'cost-benefit' approach views countries as contrasting the costs of rescheduling or default against the benefit windfall gain. Under this approach, political risk will matter in addition to economic risk factors, with politics determining willingness to meet debt-servicing requirements. In addition to these factors influencing the demand for rescheduling, Cline (1984) also emphasizes that the 'supply' of rescheduling, or the non-supply of foreign credit, can matter. A reduced form equation is then typically estimated, which reflects the joint effect of these demand and supply influences. As IBRD loans are of medium to longer term maturities on average, we presume that the default decision is separable from the initial borrowing decision, enabling us not to have to consider game-theoretic analysis of strategic borrowing (which data limitations would prohibit) and
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the external environment below, with an emphasis on the areas where our choice of variables differs from, or develops, the existing literature.
Economic Risk Factors
The choice of economic risk factors in much of the literature on external debt repayment has been guided by the results of an influential study, by Avramovic (1964) , of the factors influencing a country's ability to service its external debt. They identify short-term liquidity factors, or traditional debt and financial ratios, and longer-term indicators of economic health and growth. Structural variables reflecting the long-term economic health of the country are generally not direct causes of default, but countries with poor fundamentals are more likely to develop economic problems that do bring on default (Dym, 1997) . This suggests the need to consider longer time lags of these variables. The literature survey of Aylward & Thorne (1998) suggests that it is the debt and financial ratios that most consistently seem to be significant. We group the economic risk factors into four categories: Debt and financial ratios, Resource Availability, Economic Conditions and Structural Factors, and Economic Policy Indicators. Debt and financial ratios pertaining to Official, Multilateral and IBRD Debt are considered alongside the traditional ratios for total debt stock. In the working paper version of this paper (McKenzie, 2002) we consider 29 such measures, containing all variables used in studies given in the literature review of Aylward & Thorne (1998, p. 11) along with other variables suggested by theory and IBRD-specific variables. Principal components analysis was then used to identify a more parsimonious set of predictors.
2
The debt and financial ratios considered are Total Debt/Exports, Private Arrears/Total Debt Stock, Short-term Debt/Total Debt, IBRD Debt Stock/ Total Debt Stock, and Total Debt Service Paid/Total Debt Service Due. Historical information on debt service due is not available in an easily accessible format from any of the standard sources, so empirical work has typically used debt service paid rather than service due. However, we constructed a series of total debt due from paper records and the World Debt Tables. The debt paid/due ratios enable us to look directly at the ability of a country to service all its liabilities; with a country that is not paying all of the amount due to other creditors perhaps more likely to default to the IBRD.
Measures of resource availability are the ratio of Reserves to Imports, Gross National Savings/GNP, Exports/GDP and Imports/GDP. Economic conditions are captured by the GNP per capita and GNP per capita growth rates. Economic policy indicators used are the Inflation rate, Government expenditure/GDP, Government revenue/GDP and Government Deficit/ 432 David J. McKenzie
GDP. An Appendix to the paper 3 provides a detailed description of each variable.
Political Risk
The creditworthiness of a sovereign nation depends on both the government's ability and its willingness to repay its debt commitments. The economic factors considered above address the ability of a country to repay; political risk addresses the willingness. In a cross-sectional study, Brewer & Rivoli (1990) examined the effects of politics on perceived country creditworthiness, as measured by country risk ratings, secondary market debt prices and risk premiums charged on sovereign loans. Their results suggest that political variables are at least as important as economic variables in explaining perceived creditworthiness. In contrast, Lee (1993) used the same political variables and a different subset of economic variables, and found that bankers' credit ratings appear to assign larger weight to economic variables than to political instability variables. Nonetheless, the frequency of changes in the regime and armed conflict are still found to have an impact on credit ratings. Both these studies offer only cross-sectional comparisons across countries, and do not investigate the effect of political variables in a panel framework.
We might expect political factors to have an even stronger impact on a country's decision to default to the IBRD. The IBRD's status as a preferred creditor and its role as a catalyst in attracting financing for countries from other creditors suggest that a country would be likely to emphasize meeting its financial obligations to the IBRD ahead of those to bilateral or commercial creditors. Therefore, if default does occur, it may result from a deliberate political act, arising from political tensions between the defaulter nation and the nations with the larger controlling shares in the World Bank. That is, nations may be particularly unwilling to repay the IBRD, even if they are able to repay some other creditors.
In recent years there has been a proliferation of data measuring various aspects of governance. 4 However, the majority of these series are of relatively recent origin, preventing their use in our study. Political Risk Services (PRS) produces the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which has supplied monthly data on a variety of political, financial and economic risk factors since 1982.
5 In addition to a total political risk score, it also provides scores for 12 components of political risk. This detailed breakdown of the political risk index enables us to examine which, if any, of the dimensions of political risk have most impact on sovereign default. For each measure, a lower score means higher political risk. In addition to the overall index, we consider the government stability, involvement of the military in politics, the extent of law and order, and investment profile conditions as individual risk factors. Again, principal components analysis was used to reduce multicollinearity concerns.
External Conditions
External factors may also impact on default. We consider three external economic factors: the three month real LIBOR interest rate, which affects the cost of new finance, 6 the G7 current account balance 7 as a percentage of GDP, which affects demand for developing country exports and global liquidity, and the deviation of OECD per capita GNP growth from 2%. This last variable is intended to measure the business cycle in OECD countries, with growth appearing to trend around a 2% level.
An Econometric Model of Sovereign Default
The dependent variable, Y it is a binary choice variable that takes the value one if country i defaults on its debt in year t, and 0 otherwise. We use panel data binary choice techniques to model this default. Following Hajivassiliou (1989) one can view the latent variable Y it * as representing country i's underlying creditworthiness, which depends upon observable economic and political characteristics and world conditions, measured by a vector x it-1 , an unobserved individual country effect, denoted i , and an error term u it . We consider only lagged values of the explanatory variables in order to reflect the assumed direction of causation, and hence help mitigate simultaneity effects. Furthermore, from a practical perspective, the use of lagged data is more useful for ex-ante creditworthiness assessments. We therefore have:
Then when this creditworthiness, or more precisely propensity to default, exceeds the normalized threshold value of 0, we observe that the country defaults. Thus we have that:
We considered three different deflators of the nominal LIBOR rate: industrial inflation, the annual percentage change in all developing countries' Export Unit Values (EUVs), and the annual change in the non-oil developing countries' EUVs. Deflating by either of the EUVs gives a much more volatile real interest rate series than deflating by industrial inflation, and we find the industrial inflation deflated LIBOR rate to be preferable in our analysis.
7
In calculating G7 current account balance/GDP percentages and OECD per capita GNP growth rates we weighted individual country figures by the share of that country's GNP in total G7 or OECD GNP, reflecting the differences in the global importance of individual economies.
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Then by making specific assumptions about the distribution of the error term, u it in equation (1), we can calculate the probability of a default occurring. The use of panel data allows us to control for unobserved individual country characteristics, denoted by i , which reflect persistent heterogeneity amongst nations. A standard issue in panel data econometrics is then whether to treat these effects as fixed or random. A major drawback of fixed effect estimation for our analysis is that only countries for which Y it switches contribute identifying information to the likelihood function, hence estimation excludes all information from countries which did not default at least once during the sample period. Given the small number of defaulting countries, this has rather severe consequences for sample size and hence we prefer a random effects logit specification.
8
State Dependence
In their literature survey, Aylward & Thorne (1998, p. 14) find that 'past repayment history has been found to be significant in every study in which it has been tested'. It is important to test, therefore, whether this merely reflects the omission of important variables from all such studies, or whether a country's default behaviour does in fact change once it enters non-accrual status. Heckman (1981) makes a distinction between structural and spurious state dependence. In the context of sovereign default to the IBRD, structural state dependence would occur if a country that had previously defaulted would default again when faced with the exact same economic and political conditions under which a country that had not previously defaulted would not default, perhaps because a previous default has a permanent influence on creditworthiness reputation. In contrast spurious state dependence occurs when 'individuals differ in certain unmeasured variables that influence their probability of experiencing the event, but that are not influenced by the experience of the event' (Heckman 1981, pp. 91-92) . The omission of political considerations in many previous studies would be one such occurrence.
These considerations mean that it is important to test for true versus spurious state dependence in order to determine whether a dynamic model is appropriate. Testing is complicated by the possible presence of heterogeneity, represented by the i terms. Even if there is no state dependence, as long as there are individual effects in the model it will be the case that Pr(y it ͉x it ,y it-l ) Pr(y it ͉x it ). Baltagi (1995) suggests that one first runs the pooled logit model, and tests whether ϭ 0 in the model Pr(y it ϭ 1 ͉x it , y it-1 ) ϭ F(xЈ it ϩ y it-1 ), where F(.) is the c.d.f. of a logistic distribution. If the null hypothesis that ϭ 0 is not rejected, then we can proceed with the pooled logit model and ignore the panel nature of the data. Rejection of 8 Fixed effects estimation gave the same signs for all coefficients as were obtained for random effects, but not all variables were significant due to the small sample size available.
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the null may occur due to serial correlation in the error term arising from individual effects, or from state dependence. Hsiao (1986) then outlines a simple test for state dependence, due to Chamberlain. After conditioning on the individual effects, i s, one includes lagged xs without lagged ys in the model, and tests the null of no state dependence by testing whether: Pr(y it ϭ 1͉x it , x it-1, …, i ) ϭ Pr(y it ϭ 1͉x it , i ). Rejection of the null indicates that there is state dependence, and hence the need to include lags of the dependent variable in the model.
The best indicator of the model's performance is its degree of success in predicting the occurrence and absence of default. The estimation process yields predicted probabilities for each country. To translate these into predictions about default it is necessary to choose a threshold probability P* above which a country is predicted to default and below which no default takes place. Cline (1984) suggests that the critical threshold should be chosen so as to minimize total error subject to a relatively equal percentage rate of error across the two types. He finds that a threshold level of 0.041 best achieves this balance, and attributes the low level to the large imbalance between non-rescheduling and rescheduling cases in his sample. This high propensity of non-event cases also characterizes our sample, and we use a threshold of 0.05 for the majority of our study. Table 1 presents the panel logit estimation results for default on IBRD loans. We first present the saturated model, which contains at least one element from each of the principal components found, and covers the main variables found in the literature. The lagged default term is the most significant explanatory variable, and we reject the joint null of no state dependence and no heterogeneity. The estimated coefficients for the pooled logit and random effects logit are equal for the saturated model, a result of the extreme overfitting here. The second and third columns of Table 1 give the estimates, for the pooled logit and random effects logit respectively, for the preferred sub-model of this saturated model, selected via a general-to-specific modelling strategy. A likelihood ratio test does not reject the submodel in favour of the saturated model. 9 In this submodel the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance, denoted , is 0.10, and a chi-squared test does not reject that ϭ 0. Thus the random effects and pooled estimators do not differ greatly, and efficiency concerns therefore dictate that one should use the pooled logit P-Value: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level or lower. Type I & Type II errors based on a 0.05 probability threshold. Standardized Coefficients represent the average impact of a unit change in the regressor on the probability of default.
Econometric Results
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estimator. Any country heterogeneity is captured by the lagged dependent variable and the other explanatory variables. Chamberlain's test for state dependence was carried out for both the saturated and the submodel, using random effects estimators to condition on any individual country effects. In both cases we overwhelmingly reject the null of no state dependence, and hence need to include the lagged dependent variable in our model. The interpretation of this is that a country that has defaulted in the previous period exhibits different default behaviour to one that hasn't, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, for comparison purposes, in the last two columns we include only the first time a country defaults, and find the same variables to be significant in predicting entry into default. For countries that are already in default, the lagged dependent variable in our sub-models suggest that they will be likely to remain in default, while the other variables in the model help predict which countries will enter default, and which are less likely to leave default status.
The submodel shows that default to the IBRD can be modelled parsimoniously through six explanatory variables, all of which are significant at the 90% level. A country is more likely to default on its IBRD debt if it defaulted in the previous period, if it has a large private arrears to total debt ratio, and if it has been paying only a small proportion of its total debt service due in the preceding period. These latter two debt ratios show that a country's debt-servicing performance with other creditors impacts on its ability to meet IBRD obligations. A large budget deficit relative to GDP makes a country more liable to default to the IBRD, reflecting the effects of a sovereign's demand for borrowing. Politics matters, especially the extent of military involvement in the politics of a country. Recall that a higher value for the political variables represents less political risk. Unsurprisingly, a country is more likely to default involving a coup d'é tat. 10 The final factor to have an effect is the G7 Current Account Balance/GDP ratio, reflecting the importance of the global environment on sovereign default. Theoretically, this ratio represents both the demand by G7 countries for other nations' exports and also the supply of funds available from G7 countries. We find a greater G7 current account surplus relative to GDP to reduce the probability of default. This indicates that the liquidity effect, whereby more global funds are available for borrowing, dominates any effect from a reduction in exports to the propensity to default. In the data we see this through a close association between the real LIBOR rate and the G7 Current Account/GDP ratio.
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With a 0.05 threshold, the Type I error is 4.88% and the Type II error is 8.68%, which indicates a good within sample fit. We then re-estimated the model using only defaults which occurred prior to 1994, using this model to examine the out-of-sample fit over the period 1994-98. 12 The model correctly predicted 15 out of 16 defaults and 268 out of 272 non-default cases.
Model Robustness
None of the other variables listed in Table 1 , nor related measures, had a significant coefficient when added individually to the model above, nor were further lags of the dependent variable found to be significant. To test whether some of the structural factors, such as GNP per capita and growth rates were having an effect over a longer time frame, lags of one to five years of these variables were tried, and all resulted in insignificance. We tested for an interaction between the political score and the share of multilateral or IBRD debt of total debt and could not reject the null hypothesis of no interaction. This suggests that politics has a direct effect on default, rather than merely through its influence on the sources of financing that a country can obtain. Throughout the addition of these variables, the coefficients of the model in Table 1 maintained their sign, significance, and generally their magnitude, showing the model to be robust to alternate specifications. Table 2 reports the results of using panel logit analysis to model the likelihood of default to Paris Club creditors. There was a much higher incidence of default to the Paris Club than to the IBRD. The pooled and random effects logit estimates are once again identical to each other in the saturated model. A test of ϭ 0 did not reject the null in the submodels either, and we hence report only the pooled logit estimates for the submodels.
Results for Paris Club Default Estimation
In the third column of Table 2 we report our preferred model for Paris Club default, which was exhaustively tested against alternatives following the steps used in modelling default to the IBRD. The resultant model includes several of the variables most often found to be significant in the literature. We find that the higher a country's short-term debt as a percentage of total debt, the higher its total debt stock relative to exports, the greater its arrears to private creditors, and the lower its reserves relative to imports, then the more likely the country is to be in default to Paris Club creditors. These financial variables show that it is not just total debt, but also its composition that is important to creditworthiness. The
12
Of course this is not a true test of out-of-sample fit as we have already used the data from 1994-98 in our model selection process. However, the scarcity of defaults precludes withholding these observations from all stages of the estimation process, and the analysis carried out here at least indicates that the model is stable over this period. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 0.30 probability threshold used in this Table to determine Type I and Type II errors. strongest effect is once again the rescheduling history, reflecting state dependence. More exports relative to GDP and less imports relative to GDP have a weak effect on reducing the likelihood of default. Two external variables are found to have highly significant effects on the likelihood of default to Paris Club creditors. In common with the IBRD default model, a G7 current account surplus, reflecting increased liquidity, lessens the chance of any country defaulting. Secondly, an increase in the real LIBOR rate raises the likelihood of default to Paris Club creditors. This effect is closely related to the current account effect, although both variables show up as significant in the model. On the political front, we once again find that greater involvement of the military in politics raises the likelihood of default, but this effect is offset to a degree by the total political score. For a given level of military involvement, a reduction in total political risk actually increases the likelihood of default.
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The higher incidence of default indicates that, to balance Type I and II errors, we should use a higher cut-off threshold for determining predicted default, and we find 0.30 to be an appropriate level. Again this is set at a level slightly below the sample mean incidence of defaults, reflecting a greater concern with Type I errors. The within-sample type I and type II error rates are both low, at 5.4% and 6.5% respectively, suggesting this model provides a good fit in determining creditworthiness to Paris Club creditors.
Results for Commercial Bank Default Estimation
We next turn our attention to Commercial Bank lending. Once again we do not reject the hypothesis of no random effects, and hence Table 3 reports the pooled logit estimates used to model default to this group of creditors. We see that, in common with the Paris Club default models, the saturated model has a lot more significant variables than in the case of IBRD default. Column 2 reports the estimates for the preferred model for modelling the likelihood of default to Commercial Banks. Financial, political and external variables all have strong effects on the propensity to default to Commercial Banks. The financial variables all take the expected signs: a country with high private arrears relative to total debt, high short-term debt and a low proportion of private debt service due being paid is more likely to default. Again the lagged dependent variable is the most significant term. Several dimensions of political risk have an impact on defaults to Commercial Banks -a lower investment profile score (which measures the government's attitude to inward investment), a greater involvement of the military in politics, and poor law and order all 13 This somewhat counterintuitive result reflects the fact that we measure Paris Club default by means of rescheduling agreements, which require both an IMF programme and negotiations with multiple creditors. An unstable political system may prevent these from occurring, reducing the probability of a default being measured. This suggests that one may wish to supplement Paris Club rescheduling data with arrears data to obtain a more inclusive definition of Paris Club defaults. make a country more likely to default to Commercial Banks. This interpretation is complicated by the positive sign on the total political risk index, which serves to reduce the joint effect of these three components. The overall political effect is still that greater political risk increases the likelihood of default. In common with the IBRD and Paris Club models, the G7 Current account surplus relative to GDP has a negative impact on the propensity to default.
Comparison of Models
We have found that different models are needed to model default to the three types of creditors, but that all three models contain financial, political, and external variables. All three models contain the lagged dependent variable, indicating that state dependence is important, and also the arrears to private creditors, the extent of the military in politics, and the G7 Current Account/GDP ratio. All three models also contain one further debt ratio variable, although the actual variable differs across models. It is noticeable that the government budget deficit/GDP ratio is important for modelling default to the IBRD, but not to the other creditors. This may reflect the increased reluctance of nations to default to the IBRD, compared with the other creditor groups, so that a government will use its resources to meet IBRD payments if at all possible. In our sample, only three default observations had budget surpluses in the year prior to default, with only a single case of a country entering into default with a budget surplus.
Modelling IBRD Default as a Two-step Process
The above analysis models default to each creditor group separately. However, the preferred model for IBRD default contains the extent of arrears to private creditors, and the repayment performance to all creditors as explanatory variables, demonstrating a link between default to other creditors and default to the IBRD. In this section we examine this link more closely, to ascertain whether there is evidence for a creditor hierarchy, whereby countries first default to Commercial Banks and Paris Club creditors, and then subsequently default to the IBRD.
We consider two different approaches to examine this hypothesis. First, the predicted probability of default to Commercial Banks 14 in year t is used as an explanatory variable in the panel logit analysis of IBRD default in year t. The resulting model then shows the additional factors in year t-1 which impact on the probability of default to the IBRD. Model A1 in Table   14 The correlation of 0.64 between the predicted probabilities of default to Commercial Banks and to Paris Club creditors meant that both predicted probabilities could not be used as significant regressors in the logit analysis. We used predicted defaults to Commercial Banks as this gave a closer fit.
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4 reports the results of this analysis. 15 As hypothesized, the likelihood of default to the IBRD is strongly positively related to the estimated probability of default to Commercial Banks. Conditional on the probability of defaulting to Commercial Banks, a country is more likely also to default to the IBRD if it has a low share of official debt service due being paid, a larger share of IBRD debt in the total debt, a high level of military involvement in government, and more short-term debt. Conversely, the last two columns of Table 4 show that the predicted probability of default to the IBRD does not help predict default to Commercial Banks. This shows the direction of causation runs from Commercial Bank default to subsequent IBRD default, and not vice versa.
The second approach used to examine the plausibility of a default hierarchy is to restrict the sample to consider only countries that are in default to either Commercial Banks and/or Paris Club creditors in year t-1 when modelling default to the IBRD in year t. Model B1 shows that nations with a high share of IBRD debt in total debt, high short term debt, a low share of official debt service due being paid, a higher total arrears to total debt ratio, and high government consumption relative to GDP are more likely to default to the IBRD having already defaulted to other creditors. Once again politics matters. Countries with a large involvement of military in politics are more likely to default to the IBRD.
A cursory examination of the IBRD default history shows that countries typically 16 default to other creditors before defaulting to the IBRD; this analysis enables us to understand more clearly why certain countries do not continue into default to the IBRD, whereas others do. The results provide evidence of a graduated hierarchy of default, whereby nations first default to other creditor groups, and then only default to the IBRD under more severe circumstances. A country with a high share of short-term debt and IBRD debt will clearly find it harder to make its IBRD payments, and together with unfavourable political circumstances, such as a heavy military presence and external conflict, this will increase the chances of subsequent default to the IBRD.
Conclusions
The small number of cases of IBRD non-accrual and their seemingly idiosyncratic, political nature has led several observers to conclude that one can not simply model IBRD default. This study provides some ammunition against this viewpoint, and shows that while modelling can be 15 The sample is the same as for Tables 1-3 with the exception of data on one country which defaulted to the IBRD and stopped paying other creditors, without a formal London Club agreement (see footnote 16) and one country for which data were not available. 16 The only cases of default to the IBRD without 'default' to other creditors are for two countries that did not obtain IMF Programmes, and thus could not undertake Paris or London Club reschedulings. Nevertheless these countries stopped paying their other creditors, and a better definition of default would capture this. Model A1 conditions on the predicted probability of default to Commercial Banks Model B1 uses only the sample of countries which were in default to either Paris Club or Commercial Bank Creditors in the previous period.
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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difficult, it is possible to identify key economic, political and external variables that impact on the likelihood that a country will default to the IBRD. The results provide evidence of a graduated hierarchy of defaults, whereby countries in trouble first default to Paris Club and/or Commercial Bank creditors, and only then default to the IBRD if circumstances are particularly unfavourable. Default to the IBRD is thus a distinct, but related, phenomenon to default to other creditor groups. We modelled IBRD default both separately, and through a two-step process whereby we first considered default to other creditors, and examined the factors that result in subsequent default to the IBRD. In both cases we arrive at a parsimonious model of IBRD default in which a country is more likely to default if it has severe problems with other creditors, if it is running a large budget deficit relative to GDP, and if it has a high military presence in government, reflecting unfavourable political conditions. 
